The air garrisons in the Gilberts, 100 miles to the north at Mille in the Marshalls, and 530 miles to the west at Nauru were overwhelmed SEA POWER U.
It was now possible for the first major carrier-paced offensive to begin. By November four large and five small carriers had been added to the existing force which comprised only the Enterprise and Saratoga, and a total of eight escort carrers had been assembled. These were in the nature of training and probing operations for the new Essex- and Independence-class carriers as theyarrived in the Pacific. The fastcarrer forces conducted strikes against Marcus in August, Tarawa and Makin in September, and Wake in October. Search and photographic reconnaissance by Navy squadrons and bombing by Army aircraft were initiated against the Gilberts and southern Marshalls. Airfields were constructed at Funafuti, Nanomea, and Nukufetau in the Ellice chain, and Baker Island was developed as a staging base for Army bombers based at Canton. Because it was expected that an advance on the Marshalls might be met with opposition of the same intensity and caliber the first steps were cautious. 29 The summer of 1943 saw the Marine and Army air units in the Solomons and the Fifth Army Air Force in New Guinea engaged in a death struggle with Japanese naval aviation based at Rabaul and Bougainville. With the necessary equipment on hand and assured of a continuing supply of replacements and reinforcements, the United States prepared to launch its drives at the Japanese Empire. Although the Army-Air Forces supplied heavy and medium bombardment groups as needed, the nature of the Central Pacific made the theater primarily a Navy responsibility. available both fast and escort carriers in increasing nunbers, its land-based and tender-based squadrons, and Marine garrison air forces. Marine air units were retained in the northern Solomons and the Admiralties to interdict bypassed enemy garrisons on Bougainville, New Britain, and New Ireland. The contribution of naval aviation to the Southwest Pacific advance was largely in reconnaissance and antishipping attacks. With the taking of the Philippines, the same forces could be withdrawn and used to move north and west from the Marianas toward the Bonins and Okinawa and finally to prepare an amphibious assault on the Japanese homeland. As it waS expected that the Japanese Fleet would make its main resistance in this area, both carriers and heavy naval units were assigned to the Central Pacific. Because land-based air cover was impossible to maintain beyond 300 miles from base, carrier aviation necessarily played a major role.
The Central Pacific, however, presented the problems of much longer over-water operations starting from the Ellice Islands and proceeding from the Gilberts through the Marshalls and Marianas to the western Carolines from which a long jump could he made to the Philippines in collaboration with the Southwest Pacific forces. Except for three of the longer jumps, this campaign did not require carrier aviation and could be conducted by the Army supported by landbased air and relatively light naval forces.
#Kami japanese amphibious series#
Based on Australia, the first was to proceed by a series of amphibious hops along the north coast of New Guinea to Morotai and thence to the Philippines. Simultaneous advances were to be conducted by Southwest and Central Pacific forces. From the Marianas it would be possible to bomb Japan and from the Philippines to sever the route to the Southern Resources Area. This in turn required the defeat and, if possible, the destruction of the Japanese Navy 1 and the capture by amphibious landings of those bases necessary to the operations of United States air and naval foces. Both these objectves could be atained if the United States won control of the sea in the western Pacific. The second possibility was a bombing attack on the home industries which could be effectively conducted once strategic islands within range had been captured. Shipping and the supply routes presented an inviting objective. The weakness in their strategic pattern was the separation of the industrial homeland from sources of raw material and the consequent dependence on water transportation not only to supply wide-flung military and naval units but also to maintain the Empire economy. Except for the Solomons and the Aleutians, where Attu and Kiska had been retaken, the Japanese still held the perimeter which they had staked out in 1942.
By the autumn of 1943 the United States waS able to supply the Pacific theater with sufficient ships, planes, ground forces, and supporting equipment to undertake operations on a large scale. The offensive against Japan depended upon United States forces supplemented by such units as its Allies could spare from commitments elsewhere.
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